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Abstract 
Computer forensics and privacy protection fields are two conflicting directions in computer security. In the other words, computer 
forensics tools try to discover and extract digital evidences related to a specific crime, while privacy protection techniques aim at 
protecting the data owner’s privacy. As a result, finding a balance between these two fields is a serious challenge. Existing privacy-
preserving computer forensics solutions consider all data owner’s data as private and, as a result, they collect and encrypt the entire 
data. This increases the investigation cost in terms of time and resources. So, there is a need for having privacy levels for computer 
forensics so that only relevant data are collected and then only private relevant data are encrypted. This research paper proposes 
privacy levels for computer forensics. It starts with classifying forensic data, and analyzing all data access possibilities in computer 
forensics. Then, it defines several privacy levels based on the found access possibilities. The defined privacy levels lead to more 
efficient privacy-preserving computer forensics solution.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs. 
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1. Introduction 
The currently widely used procedure for collecting digital evidence in computer forensics involves the creation of 
a bit-by-bit image from the data owner’s physical storage and then later analyzing the bit-by-bit image at a Computer 
Forensics Laboratory (CFL). Using this procedure, all of the data found in the storage of the data owner (suspect, 
victim, or any related party to the crime) are collected and analyzed. In fact, this procedure has been proven to be a 
non-practical solution because of increases in the quantities of storage and data commonly owned, which increase the 
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investigation cost in terms of the required time and resources 2,1 . The problem becomes worse when dealing with a 
server’s storage because of the huge amount of data involved and many users not related to the crime under 
investigation. 
In addition, this procedure creates a significant problem when the data owner’s privacy is a concern. Collecting 
only relevant data is a key point for privacy preservation. Recently, a selective imaging concept has been proposed to 
gather only data relevant to the crime, which would reduce the investigation cost. However, selectively imaging only 
the relevant data is still not a sufficient solution for privacy preservation in computer forensics, and many other 
requirements must be addressed such as specifying privacy policies, collecting only relevant data, using cryptographic 
techniques, taking into account existing privacy act(s), and auditing the investigation process 8,7,6,5,4,3 . 
However, collecting the relevant data while ignoring irrelevant data is a key point for privacy preservation in 
computer forensics, as mentioned earlier, and then only private relevant data are encrypted. But, this needs having 
some privacy levels that which data have to be collected or not, and encrypted or not. Existing privacy-preserving 
computer forensics solutions 14,13,12,11,10,9 are not efficient because they require the collection and encryption of all the 
data. This is because collecting and encrypting all data is not an acceptable solution especially when dealing with 
shared storages or servers.  
In this research paper, privacy levels are proposed for computer forensics. However, the privacy levels help for 
classifying the forensic data into relevant and non-relevant as well as classifying the relevant data into private and 
non-private. Hence, at the end, only relevant data are collected, and only private relevant data are encrypted during the 
collection process. This leads to improve the investigation efficiency by reducing the required costs (in terms of time 
and resources).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the related works on privacy 
preservation in computer forensics. Section 3 presents the proposed privacy levels for computer forensics. Section 4 
discusses the proposed privacy levels. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with possible future work. 
2. Related Work 
Several researches 8,7,6,5,4,3  have studied the conflict between privacy preservation and computer forensics. These 
studied suggest specifying accountability and before-the-fact privacy policies, along with using cryptographic 
techniques for preserving the private data during the evidence acquisition phase. Furthermore, they suggest that 
existing computer forensics tools, such as EnCase 15 , Forensic ToolKit 16 , must consider existing privacy acts. In 
addition, cryptographic techniques can be used to provide a privacy protection. 
However, existing solutions can be classified into two branches: policy-based and cryptographic approaches. The 
policy-based approaches can be further classified into two approaches namely policy statements and privacy policies
18,17 . In fact, the goal of using the policy-based approaches is to let the data owner know how his private data should 
be collected, used, and disclosed. The cryptographic approaches 14,13,12,11,10,9 protect the data owner’s private data 
during the investigation process. They encrypt all relevant and irrelevant data (even private or not) using some 
cryptographic techniques such as searchable encryption technique. All data owner’s data are considered relevant and 
private, means the entire data are collected and encrypted. This increases the investigation cost in terms of time and 
resources. As discussed earlier, there is a need for collecting only relevant data as well as encrypting only private 
relevant data. 
In Halboob et al. 19 , we proposed a computer forensics framework that includes a definition for some privacy levels 
for computer forensics. Nevertheless, it has been proven that one level is not practical. Though, in this research 
different and refined privacy levels are defined.  
3. The Proposed Privacy Levels 
The privacy levels are generally used to explain the levels of privacy protection that the data collector must provide. 
Recent studies on computer forensics consider all the data owner’s data as private. Therefore, they encrypt and encrypt 
the entire data. In fact, considering all the forensic data to be private requires protecting (e.g., encrypting) all these 
data, which consumes more time for data encryption and decryption.  
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In general, to define privacy levels, the targeted data (e.g., forensic data) should be classified into several groups. 
These groups can be used to determine all the access possibilities, which lead to defining the required privacy levels. 
The data can be classified based on several factors, including the privacy, relevancy, etc.  
In computer forensics, there is a conflict because the data owner has no right to prevent the investigator from 
accessing his private data. However, the data owner has a right to decide whether his data, or a set of his data, are 
private and has a right to ask for privacy protection under any privacy act or policy applied in the area that the computer 
crime occurred. At the same time, the investigator has a right to collect any data, private or not, relevant to the crime. 
Thus, classifying the forensic data into some groups is a cooperative task between the data owner and investigator. 
Though, to define privacy levels for computer forensics, several steps should be taken into account, which are: 
x Classifying the forensic data into groups based upon their privacy and relevancy.  
x Analyzing all the data access possibilities upon the classified data’s groups.  
x Defining the privacy levels. 
3.1. Forensic Data Classification 
Forensic data are classified here using two factors: privacy and relevancy. From the data owner’s point-of-view, 
the forensic data can be classified either as private or non-private. In general, all data can be considered by default to 
be private, but this classification (private and non-private) is from a computer forensics perspective.  
More specifically, when the data owner claims that sets of his/her data are non-private, it means non-private to the 
investigation authority. For example, the data that are freely disseminated such as movies, clips, newsletters, books, 
etc. can be considered to be non-private (or public data). Thus, there is no need to consider these types of data to be 
private to reduce the investigation time or, in other words, to minimize the required encryption time. 
In fact, the data owner can decide whether a set of his own data is private or not based on the investigation’s privacy 
protection status, which determines whether or not the investigation authority protects the collected data of the data 
owner during the investigation process. The privacy protection provided can be through policy means (e.g., ethics 
rules, policies) or the use of other information security solutions such as auditing, access control, etc. The data owner 
builds his/her trust upon the privacy protection granted by the investigation authority. In other words, the trust degree 
is about how much the data owner trusts the investigation authority in terms of the privacy protection solutions 
provided. In computer forensics, some investigation authorities have some privacy protection granted as an internal 
access authorization such as ethical rules, policies, access control, and auditing.  
At the end, a data owner may consider a set of his data to be private or not based on several factors such as the data 
sensitivity, investigation authority, privacy protection granted, etc. If the investigation authority provides some privacy 
protection guarantee to the data owner, the data owner may trust the investigation authority based on this guarantee 
and classify his data as non-private. Based on this trust degree, the data owner makes his/her decision during the 
classifying of his/her data as private or non-private. 
From the investigator’s point-of-view, forensic data can be classified as either relevant or non-relevant. The 
relevant data are any data considered by the investigator to be related to the crime being investigated. The forensic 
data relevancy is determined based on the investigation’s goal and scope, which limit the investigator’s access to 
certain data only. In addition, the data relevancy can be determined based on the crime being investigated. The 
investigator may know (based on the reported crime) that the requested digital evidence is, for example, a photo or 
email. Thus, there is no need to consider other types of data as relevant. In anyway, at the end the forensic data has 
the following four possible groups: 
x Non-private and non-relevant 
x Non-private and relevant 
x Private and non-relevant 
x Private and relevant   
 
373 Waleed Halboob et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  56 ( 2015 )  370 – 375 
3.2. Forensic Data Access Possibilities 
Based on the forensic data groups defined in the previous section, all the data access possibilities in computer 
forensics are analyzed and listed in Table 1. There are three access possibilities namely no collection, direct collection, 
and privacy-preserved collection. 
  Table 1. Forensic data access possibilities in computer forensics 
No. Forensic Data Data Access Possibilities 
Relevancy 
(0: non-relevant; 
1: relevant) 
Privacy 
(0: non-private; 1: 
private 
1 0 0 No collection 
 
0 1 
2 1 0 Direct collection (no privacy concern) 
3 1 1 User’s choice (direct or in a privacy-preserving manner). 
  
In addition, as shown in the above table, there are three forensic data access possibilities:  
x If the forensic data (or a subset of forensic data) are classified by the investigator as non-relevant (private 
or not), then these data (or this subset of data) should not be collected at all. This means selective imaging 
must be used to collect only relevant data.  
x When the forensic data (or a subset of forensic data) are classified as non-private and relevant by the data 
owner and investigator, respectively, these data (or this subset of data) can be collected directly. This 
means the data are collected without any privacy preservation. 
x If the forensic data (or a subset of the forensic data) are considered to be relevant and private by the 
investigator and data owner, respectively, the data owner has a right to choose whether his data can be 
collected directly or in a privacy-preserving manner.  
3.3. Defined Privacy Levels 
As illustrated in Table 1, there are three different possibilities for accessing the forensic data: no collection, direct 
collection, and privacy-preserving collection. Thus, three privacy levels are defined for computer forensics based on 
these defined access possibilities. These levels are listed in Table 2. 
 TABLE 2. Privacy levels for computer forensics 
No. Level Name Description 
1 Direct Accessible Data (DAD) Data are relevant and non-private so it can be directly imaged and 
analyzed. 
2 Privacy-Preserved Accessed Data 
(PAD) 
Data are relevant as well as private. Therefore, a privacy preservation 
technique(s) needs to be applied during the data imaging and analysis. 
3 Non-Accessible Data (NAD) These data are not relevant to the investigated crime and are not 
accessible at all. 
4. Discussion 
In this Section, the proposed privacy levels are discussed, by presenting a scenario to show how they can be 
enforced while investigating. To enforce the privacy levels, the forensic data must be classified first into relevant and 
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non-relevant as mentioned earlier. Also, the relevant data need to be classified into private and non-private. In fact, 
selecting the relevant or private forensic data requires the application of a pre-analysis process before imaging any 
data. Normally, the analysis step comes after collecting the forensic data and is executed at a Computer Forensics 
Laboratory (CFL). As needed in the selective imaging concept, selecting which data are private and relevant requires 
the application of a pre-analysis step before collecting or imaging the forensic data.  
Therefore, for relevant or/and private data selection, current and suitable forensic data recovery tools are suggested 
here. According to Turner 20 , the forensic data can be selected using three selection methods, namely manual, semi-
automatic, and fully automatic selections.  
Some recovery tools such as EnCase 15 , FTK Access Data 16 , Winhex (X-Ways) 21 , and CnWRecovery 22  have 
been tested, and it has been shown that they can be used for this purpose. In the other words, both manual and semi-
automatic forensic data selection are totally supported by these tools while the fully automatic forensic data selection 
still needs more research works 24,23 . However, these tools support full storage or disk scanning and analysis and 
allow the data owner or/and investigator to search for a set of data with several search types and options. The search 
results can be reported using csv files, and the listed data files (inside the reports) can be processed later, even by other 
applications. 
Depending on several factors such as the relevant privacy act, investigation time, etc., the data owner may consider 
all his data to be private or non-private. In addition, the investigator may consider all the forensic data to be relevant 
or non-relevant. In this case, there is no need to execute the pre-analysis selection process.  
Additionally, a very important issue is that this classification can easily be flexible. The data owner can consider 
all his data to be private or non-private. In this case, the investigation cost in terms of time can differ because 
considering all the data to be non-private means there is a need to encrypt all the data. The encryption process is an 
extra time cost during data imaging. In terms of resources, encrypting all the data may lead to an increase in the storage 
required for the collected data depending on the encryption scheme used. In anyway, if the data owner chooses to 
consider all his data as private or non-private so, in this case, there will be only two privacy levels which are DAD 
and NAD, or PAD and NAD. 
Moreover, the investigator can consider all the found forensic data to be relevant. If this happens, it increases the 
required investigation time and resources. In this case, only two privacy levels will be considered namely DAD, and 
PAD. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, privacy levels are proposed for privacy-preserving computer forensics solutions. The privacy levels 
are specified based on existing access data possibilities found in computer forensics. They can help for improving the 
investigation efficiency when the privacy is a concern. Our ongoing work is developing a privacy-preserving computer 
forensics framework based on these privacy levels. Further work is required for defining such levels and policies for 
network forensics, and supporting fully automatic data selection for selecting the private and/or relevant data. 
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